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Anyone can be a Supreme Court Justice. Surprisingly, the men who founded the United
States of America did not present explicit requirements for age, citizenship, education, or job
experience for the job of Supreme Court justices[1]. This fact would prompt an examination of
several distinct phenomena related to a central inquiry: how is it that any person can serve on the
most important court in the United States? While it is a challenging question, the following
examination will cover three key themes of a possible answer. First, it will examine how the nature
of the Court’s authority empowers the justices who decide cases. Second, the research will present
relevant historical information about the confirmation of Supreme Court justices to contextualize
itself better. Third, the confirmation process and its criticisms will be presented and evaluated to
recognize how nominees become justices on the nation’s highest court. By combing these themes
together, readers will see that the relationship between the Court and its justices is more complex
and more revealing than previously thought.
The three branches of government in the United States of America are each uniquely
positioned to exercise their constitutional powers for their citizens. The Supreme Court, in
particular, wields authority over some of the nation’s most pressing legal concern. This application
of power is premised on the assumption that the Court’s decisions will produce better and fairer
results than would occur otherwise[2]. While public support for the Court has remained steady for
the last twenty years, many of us can feel anxious about its authority[3]. The term authority in a
discussion about the Court’s legitimacy describes a decision-maker with the capacity to change a
person’s normative obligations[4]. There are many ways to address this anxiety. A legal analysis
might conclude that concepts of fairness, sanction, or even equality govern the authority of the
law[5]. However, an analysis of the foundational assumptions supporting the Court’s authority in
political theory reveals that the authority of the Court is accepted because most Americans feel

obliged to support the Constitution and the American Legal System itself[6]. The Court exerts a
type of moral authority such that the majority of Americans believe that they should follow the
law as interpreted by the justices. This idea of moral authority is crucial here because the Court
looks at cases both backward and forward. The justices must interpret what prior authorities have
decided and make decisions that must be adhered to in a moral and legal sense by the citizens of
the United States[7]. By claiming to make the best judgments morally and practically available,
the Court speaks as one voice stating that its decisions are morally binding if not morally
correct[8].
Maintaining this moral legitimacy is crucial to the survival of the Supreme Court and the
authority of its justices. While diffuse support for the Court has remained relatively constant over
the past twenty years, it is essential to acknowledge that the Court’s authority becomes more
challenging to respect when people do not agree with a decided result. Constitutional law scholar
Richard H. Fallon Jr addresses this concern saying,
“ We need to realize that moral legitimacy can exist along a spectrum. Our concern involves
a standard with respect to which we can – with ideals in view- make appraisals of more or
less. We should also remember that legitimacy is a different standard from correctness.
Decisions can be legitimate though mistaken. Finally, we need to recall that appraisals of
judicial legitimacy in the Supreme Court can have multiple components.”
In his book, Fallon reminds readers that the question of legitimacy is a complex one. The
judgments of the Court can be morally challenging insofar as the concept of right and wrong is not
always distinct in the decision’s outcome. The moral legitimacy upon which the justices rely is
subject to many perspectives and based upon principles reasonably acceptable to all. Striking that
balance and maintaining that stability is therefore crucial for the justices of the Supreme Court.

After exploring where judicial legitimacy comes from and how the justices use it, one can
understand that the justices make their decisions with the power to influence the lives of others in
significant ways. This understanding has not been forgotten during confirmations of nominees,
yet, Senators' attitudes towards the confirmation process have changed since the country began.
Reflecting on the rise of a legal philosophy known as formalism in the 1870s, early Senators
accepted the idea that judges were supposed to serve as neutral third-party arbiters whose rulings
occurred from a mechanistic style of reasoning. This view, while not eliminating political
evaluations of nominees, reduced their frequency significantly[9]. The result was an
unprecedented period of cooperation, with only one rejection out of forty-six confirmations
between 1894 and 1968[10]. During this period, the Senate viewed political interference in the
confirmation process as scornful, preferring to view judicial confirmations as welcome expressions
of non-partisanship[11].
This view of judicial nominations began to change in the 1950s following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Previous to the Brown ruling, Supreme Court
nominees rarely gave testimony. After Brown, however, every nominee testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee and was asked questions by conservative Southern Democrats about
constitutional interpretation and rights-based judicial philosophy[12]. In addition to these
developments came Reagan-era efforts to roll back New Deal regulatory powers and liberal
holdings from the justiceships of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Chief Justice Warren Burger[13].
These developments also coincided with coexisting developments of increased partisanship along
liberal/conservative lines and increased individualism among Senators. These changes increased
the factionalism theretofore unseen in the process of judicial confirmations, and as they evolved,

a significant decline in constitutional consensus with a predominant focus of ideology in the
confirmation politics followed [14].
As a brief review of the history of confirmation politics demonstrates, the nature of the
confirmation process fundamentally shifted from the mechanistic rubber stamp approach of the
late 1870s to the more ideological approach of the 1970s. Legal scholars have shown that the
nature of confirmation politics emerges from realizations that the Court influences public policy
and that a nominee’s preferences influence their views on power allocation and policy[15]. Two
schools of thought have resulted from this realization, each identifying what they see as issues in
the confirmation process in its current form: the legalist school and the politics school.
The legalist school advances criticisms of the judicial process that seek a return to the period
of harmony which existed in the first half of the twentieth century. They advocate for a greater
emphasis on the justice’s professional credentials, the exclusion of outside interest groups, less
examination of judicial ideology from a politico constitutional perspective, and decreased media
coverage of the confirmations. By encouraging these solutions, the legalists appear to scorn most
outside influence on the confirmation process as detrimental to its legitimacy. They desire a
removal of politics from the process and characterize the conflict as harmful[16]. Unfortunately,
these criticisms and the solutions that accompany them seem to lack the foresight that any changes
in the process would require. It remains to be seen if it is possible to eliminate conflict by
eliminating media access to government proceedings and excluding outside interest groups from
participation in judicial confirmation. Further, as political scientists, George Watson and John
Stookey put it, “In the midst of fundamental disagreements over the direction the nation should
go, this democratic system struggles to find a compromise that can permit the nation to move
forward in a way that is at least tolerable to most if not exactly desirable. Public debate becomes

more critical in order to find the most acceptable solution for the situation at hand[17].”
Additionally, there is nothing in the Constitution to suggest that the Supreme Court is anything
less than a political body. By arguing that the Senate should engage in less ideological examination
of nominees, the legalist school misunderstands the role of the Senate in the confirmation process.
By ignoring the role ideology plays on the court, Senators would be ill-prepared to learn what is
necessary before making an informed decision on the Court.
The politics school argues that a more active role for the Senate is the solution to the issues
in the confirmation process. Their concern is that Senators are frequently unable to give informed
consent due to their inability to extract the candidate's views on legal issues. Further, the politics
school emphasizes the President’s ability to choose any nominee, giving him an influence on
constitutional law matched only by the Court itself. The politics school argues for a more robust
check on the power of the executive branch. The need for more vigorous checks and balances is
essential because the President can control the most critical part of the process himself – choosing
a qualified nominee. The solutions the politics school presents are more institutional. Suggested
reforms include the use of special counsel during nominations, the use of a two-thirds vote
requirement for a nominee’s confirmation, and the requirement of nominees to give more candid
testimony during confirmation[18]. Each of these solutions demonstrates that the politics school
believes that change for the confirmation process can come from within the process itself.
The issue with many of these solutions, however, is that they are difficult to implement.
The solutions lack the appropriate incentives for Senatorial acceptance. For example, using a
special counsel would take away air-time for Senators on the judiciary committee and eliminate
their opportunity to let their voices be heard. Further, the lawyers nominated by the President to
serve on the Court are capable of circumventing attempts to ascertain politico-legal beliefs. What

these solutions might advocate for correctly is a more significant burden of proof on the president.
Creating a more substantial legislative check on the executive might encourage the kind of debate
the Framers envisioned between the branches of government. The result could be a more robust
confirmation process that allows senators to give informed consent for judicial nominees.
If any person can be a Supreme Court Justice, any person would have a lot to consider
before making a choice to serve on the nation’s highest court. In fact, it may well be that even if
one’s dream is not to serve on the Supreme Court, they might still want to consider the position of
its justices. With no indications that the country is becoming less polarized, the public can look to
the Supreme Court for changes of public policy in the political landscape. However, with neither
the power of the sword nor the purse, the Supreme Court is empowered to do little on its own
besides rendering decisions [19]. The survival of the Court may ultimately rest, therefore, on the
moral authority of the Court, a complicated history between the Senate and the Court, and a
confirmation process that is far from perfect. Knowing these elements in any discussion of the
Court can empower more thoughtful considerations of what is sure to be a dynamic landscape of
political thought in the coming decades.
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